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Recent work in philosophical methodology by experimental philosophers has brought to light a certain kind 
of skepticism about the role of intuitions in a priori philosophical inquiry. In this paper I turn attention 
away from a priori philosophical inquiry and on to the role of intuition in experimental design. I argue that 
even if we have reason to be skeptical about the role of intuition in a priori philosophical inquiry, we 




1.  Introduction 
 
Within epistemology, and in the particular area of philosophical methodology, there is a 
debate over the proper scope and role of intuitions in philosophical inquiry. The central 
question concerns the evidential status of appeals by philosophers to intuitions in 
defending or arguing against various philosophical theses. In this debate there are two 
camps. Evidentialists maintain that intuitions, of a certain kind and under certain 
conditions, serve as evidence in philosophical inquiry.1 Skeptics, on the other hand, 
maintain that intuitions fail to serve as evidence in philosophical inquiry.2 While some 
skeptics appeal to theoretical considerations to argue for skepticism about intuitions as 
evidence, others engage in experimental study of folk intuitions to argue for skepticism 
about intuitions.3 The later camp is a subgroup of the new movement known as 
experimental philosophy, which is now about a decade old. The subgroup of researchers 
skeptical about intuitions are called experimental restrictionists, and they aim to police, if 
not out right undermine the viability of the appeal to intuitions as evidence in philosophy. 
 
In the restrictionist camp there are two important studies that have been used as a partial 
basis for pushing experimentally based skepticism about intuition. Weinberg, Nichols, 
and Stich (2001), (WNS), argue that intuitions about Gettier cases vary across cultures. 
While Westerners typically have the intuition that Gettier cases are not cases of  
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knowledge, East Asians fail to have the intuition that Gettier cases are not cases of 
knowledge. And Swain, Alexander, and Weinberg (2008), (SAW), argue that intuitions 
about Truetemp suffer from order embedding effects. The intuition that Truetemp is a 
case of reliable belief without knowledge depends on the order in which the Truetemp 
case is presented relative to other cases of knowledge and non-knowledge. Using these 
two studies and various argumentative techniques, experimental restrictionists have 
challenged the traditional intuition based mode of philosophical inquiry.4 While the 
(WNS) study raises the problem of cultural variation, the (SAW) study raises the problem 
of reliability. Jointly the restrictionists challenge traditionalists to show how 
philosophical appeals to intuition can serve as evidence for philosophical theses in light 
of the problems of cultural variation and reliability.  
 
In what follows I will neither argue for evidentialism nor skepticism. A great deal of 
recent literature has been devoted to that issue.5 Rather, I bring out the twin positions of 
evidentialism and skepticism in the philosophical methodology debate in order to contrast 
them against a distinct thesis about the role of intuitions in experimental inquiry: The 
Dependency Thesis, (DT).  
 
(DT) Experimental inquiry that aims at the discovery of variation in intuitions about the 
application of philosophical concepts essentially depends on non-experimental intuitions 
about the application of philosophical concepts. And non-experimental intuitions are 
indispensible for experimental inquiry into the reliability of intuitions about the 
application of philosophical concepts.   
 
Let me begin by noting four points about (DT), so as to avoid confusion over the goal of 
articulating and defending it. First, (DT) is a metaphysical, as opposed to an epistemic 
thesis, about the relation between intuitions and inquiry. Second, and as a consequence of 
the first point, a defense of (DT) is not a response to the skepticism that experimental 
restrictionists’ have argued for. Third, (DT) is not a claim that aims to challenge any of 
the work that goes under the label of experimental philosophy. That is a defense of (DT) 
is not intended to show that experimental philosophy, and the work of experimental 
restrictionists, is misguided in its methods or that skepticism about traditional methods is 
unfounded. Fourth, it is not a thesis that, if true, automatically lends support to those that 
want to defend traditional a priori methods of philosophical inquiry that involve intuitions 
about thought experiments.6 Rather, (DT) is a thesis that, to my mind, has not been 
highlighted sufficiently in the literature on the role of intuitions in philosophical inquiry.7 
My hope here is that articulation of (DT) and a defense of it will bring to light a 
metaphysical relationship that obtains between intuitions about concept application and 
experimental inquiry concerning variation and reliability.  
 
The defense of (DT) I will offer comes from two sources. First, I will offer a definition of 
the technical term ‘non-experimental intuition’, and a hypothetical example to illustrate 




its function and role in experimental design. Second, I will argue for (DT) by building off 
of a response to the problem of cultural variation, which I call the disagreement dilemma. 
 
 
2.  Non-experimental intuitions 
 
A central method of research within the experimental restrictionist camp is the survey 
methodology of psychology. In the survey methodology subjects are exposed to vignettes 
that are used for the purposes of eliciting a response. The responses are taken by 
experimental restrictionists to reveal the intuitions of the subjects being tested. Now, in 
contrast to the intuitions generated from subjects’ responses to the vignettes in an 
experiment, I will define a non-experimental intuition as follows.  
 
Where C is a concept, E a specific experiment consisting of a number of cases / vignettes 
designed to test whether intuitions about C vary between two or more populations, V1…. 
Vn specific cases / vignettes in E that are used to generate intuitions about C’s 
application, P1…. Pn populations, whose intuitions about C’s application in V1…. Vn are 
being tested, a non-experimental intuition I concerning E is an intuition about C’s 
boundary conditions that is not generated from E but is necessary for V1…. Vn to be used 
as specific cases in E for inquiring into whether the intuition’s of P1…. Pn are genuinely 
about C rather than some distinct concept C*. Informally, a non-experimental intuition is 
an intuition that is not generated from a specific experiment E that is being used to test 
whether intuitions about C’s application vary between two or more populations. Rather, a 
non-experimental intuition is an intuition that either the designer of the experiment 
directly appeals to or which must eventually be appealed to on in order to establish a 
criterion for determining whether two populations share a common concept. 
 
In order to illustrate the difference between experimental and non-experimental 
intuitions, consider the following hypothetical example. Suppose that like the (WNS) 
inquiry into whether Westerners and East Asians share the Gettier intuition, one wants to 
inquire experimentally into whether Westerners and East Asians share the intuition that 
knowledge entails belief.  
 
(a) Kp → Bp 
 
In constructing an experiment to test whether knowledge entails belief, the experimenters 
would produce various vignettes involving cases of knowledge and belief. In addition, 
they might also ask the population a question concerning knowledge that is distinct from 
the question about knowledge probed in (a). For example, they might ask both 
populations whether knowledge entails truth.  
 
(b) Kp → p 





The point of asking subjects whether they believe (b) in the experimental design is to 
settles the issue of whether the two populations share a common concept. That is 
agreement on (b) serves as criterion for determining whether Westerners and East Asians 
share the same concept of knowledge. For it appears to be the case that only if both 
populations share a common concept, can they possibly disagree about whether certain 
cases fall under it, for when two individuals do not have the same concepts we don’t 
generally take their apparent verbal disagreements to be indicative of genuine 
disagreement (more on this in 3). Thus, in our hypothetical investigation, agreement on 
(b) will be necessary for any two subjects to count as having a disagreement or agreement 
over (a). Any subject that answers that (b) is false, does not count, from the perspective 
of the experiment, as possessing the concept of KNOWLEDGE for which the question 
over (a) tests for variation. Agreement over (b) serves as a fixed point for a shared 
concept between the two populations that allows for the possibility of variation over (a).  
It is also important to note that although agreement over (b) is necessary for investigation 
into variation over (a); agreement over (b) might not be sufficient. For there may be other 
conditions that in conjunction with agreement over (b) are jointly sufficient for the 
possibility of variation over (a).8  The central point of this case is to illustrate that there 
must be some way for the designer of the experiment to identify whether two populations 
share a single concept for the purposes of investigating whether the two populations have 
intuitions about the application of the concept that differ.  
 
However, one might register this point and immediately object that the requirement for a 
criterion rests on a specific theory of concepts, and thus the requirement can be avoided 
by adopting a distinct theory of concepts. In particular, one might hold that the 
requirement for a criterion for identifying a common concept between two populations 
rests on the classical conception of concepts, and is not a requirement on the prototype 
conception of concepts.9  
 
According to the classical conception (CL), concepts have strict necessary and sufficient 
conditions for application.  
 
(CL)  x is C if and only if x satisfies c1 ∧ c2…∧ cn. 
 
For example, x is EVEN if and only if x satisfies DIVISIBLE by 2.  
 
According to the prototype model (PC), x can fall under a concept to the degree that x 
satisfies some exemplar or to the degree that x satisfies some weighted measure of 
properties. 
 
(PC1) x is C if and only if x is similar to E to degree D. 
 




(PC2)  x is C if and only if x satisfies either c1 ∨ c2 ∨ c3….∨ cn or some 
combination of ci to degree D.  
 
For example, x falls under SOFA if and only if x is similar to F to degree D, where F is 
some particular SOFA exemplar. Or, for example, x satisfies FURNITURE if and only if, 
x has some or all of the following characteristics: can be used to eat on, can be used to sit 
on, is designed for resting one’s legs on, is designed for resting plates on. 
 
Given that philosophical concepts, such as knowledge, can be argued to be best modeled 
on either the classical model or some version of the prototype model, one might object to 
the need for a criterion for determining whether two populations share the same concept 
by arguing that the requirement makes sense only if one thinks of philosophical concepts 
on the classical model. On my understanding of the nature of experimental inquiry this 
objection seems to be irrelevant to the issue raised by the example above. No matter how 
concepts are modeled it appears that in order for one to determine whether two 
populations have distinct intuitions about the application of a concept one has to 
determine that they share the same concept. And in order to determine whether two 
populations share the same concept one needs a criterion, which itself needs a 
justification. Whether philosophical concepts are modeled best under the classical or 
prototype model is irrelevant to the fact that it only makes sense to say that subjects A 
and B differ in their intuitions about the application of concept C in case V, when A and 
B both possess C, read V in the same way, and operate with C when responding to the 
question concerning C after reading V. Let me now turn to a further elaboration of the 




3.  The Disagreement Dilemma 
 
Looking carefully at the work of WNS (2001), one could argue picking up on the work of 
Sosa (2007b) and (2010), that experimental work of this kind faces, what I will here call: 
The disagreement dilemma.10 Consider the following claims:11 
 
1. Two subjects, A and B, can disagree over whether concept C 
applies in case V only if A and B both possess C. 
 
2. If A and B both possess C, and testing conditions are ideal, then A 
and B cannot disagree over whether C applies in V. 
 
(1) simply specifies that disagreement over whether a concept applies in a case requires 
that the subjects possess the concept. (2) states that when two subjects possess the same 
concept it cannot be the case that their intuitions about the application of C in V are 




different. In effect (2) maintains that the best explanation for why two subjects have 
different intuitions when they both possess the same concept is that testing conditions are 
not ideal, and one or both subjects have committed a performance error. The performance 
error could be due to a failure of attention on, or understanding of, either the vignette or 
the questions posed in the experiment.  
 
Jointly (1) and (2) suggest that the discovery of variation in intuition about a concept’s 
application is impossible. Were the dilemma sound, it would appear that the whole 
program of experimental research designed to discover which intuitions about various 
philosophical concepts vary cross culturally would be empty. Of course this result is too 
extreme. How might an experimentalist interested in defending research of the kind 
exemplified in WNS (2001) respond? At least one way to respond is to simply deny (1) 
and (2). In denying (1) and (2), an experimentalist adopts a view of concepts on which it 
is possible for two subjects to possess the same concept, and yet disagree over its 
application in a given case. Thus, for example Westerners and East Asians can be said to 
both possess the same concept of knowledge, while simply disagreeing over whether 
Gettier cases are cases of justified true belief without knowledge. One way to cash out 
this response to the dilemma is by contrasting, in modal terms, two views of concepts 
with respect to disagreement. 12 
 
On the one hand, the disagreement dilemma appears to depend on an impossibility claim, 
(IMP). 
 
(IMP) It is impossible for two subjects to possess the same concept C, yet 
under ideal cognitive conditions disagree as to whether C applies in a 
given case. 
 
However, what the experimentalist needs in order to diffuse the disagreement dilemma, 
and for research on variation in intuition to be theoretically sound is a possibility claim, 
(P).  
 
(P)  It is possible for two subjects to possess the same concept C, and 
under ideal cognitive conditions disagree as to whether C applies in a 
given case.  
 
Now one could offer the following defense of why experimentalists interested in 
discovering variation in intuitions about concept application ought to accept (P). 
 
1. The discovery of variation in intuition about concept application is 
possible only if it is possible for subjects to have different intuitions about 
whether a concept applies in a given case while still possessing the same 
concept. 





2. Thus, variation in intuition about concept application is possible, 
only if (P) is true. 
 
3. So, given that discovery of variation requires (P), experimentalist 
ought to endorse (P).  
 
 
4.  A New Problem 
 
With (P) in place as a component of a model of concepts that enables empirical inquiry 
into variation in intuitions, a new problem can be generated for experimental inquiry by 
looking at a problem that an experimental designer faces. 
 
Suppose that a theorist sets out to explore whether two subjects disagree over whether C 
applies in a given case. In order for that theorist to develop an experiment that can 
genuinely test for variation under C, the theorist must distinguish between two scenarios: 
 
(i) Two subjects, A and B, both possess C and disagree about its 
application in case V. 
 
(ii) Two subjects, A and B, do not both possess C, and their 
disagreement about the application of C in V is actually an expression of 
applying two distinct concepts. 
 
By endorsing (P) one makes possible the discovery of variation in intuitions over the 
same concept and escapes the disagreement dilemma. However, in designing an 
experiment to test whether variation in intuitions over C exists, one is still required to 
distinguish genuine variation under C from non-variation under C, where the apparent 




5.  A Defense of the Dependency Thesis 
 
With (P) in place, and the new problem presented above, a defense of (DT) can now be 
constructed. 
 
In order to do this, let me return to the example of knowledge and its relation to belief 
described earlier. The point of the experiment over knowledge was to determine whether 
two distinct populations, Westerners and East Asians, have intuitions that vary with 
respect to the question of whether knowledge entails belief. Moreover one could 




hypothesize that Westerners for the most part will have the intuition that a subject cannot 
have knowledge of P without belief in P, and East Asians for the most part will have the 
intuition that a subject can have knowledge of P without belief in P. Now in designing an 
experiment to determine whether the variation in intuition is present, one needs to 
distinguish between apparent variation and genuine variation. Thus, the experiment must 
include some question about knowledge that determines that Westerners and East Asians 
share a common concept under which there is genuine variation with respect to the 
question of whether knowledge entails belief. How does one, in designing the 
experiment, choose a condition on knowledge to include in the experiment; a condition 
that will serve as the criterion for determining whether the two populations share a 
common concept? There are three possible answers. 
 
(i) The experimenter looks at the results of a distinct experiment 
concerning knowledge, to generate the appropriate condition on 
knowledge.  
 
(ii) The experimenter looks at a theory of cognition concerning 
knowledge to generate a condition on knowledge.  
 
(iii) An experimenter does not consult a distinct experiment or theory, 
but rather appeals to a non-experimental intuition about knowledge. 
  
I will argue that cases (i) and (ii) ultimately lead to case (iii). First, case (i) leads to (iii), 
since although a condition on knowledge in one experiment can come from another 
experiment, ultimately there must be an initial experiment that did not depend on a prior 
experiment. Every experiment has a non-experimental starting point. Second, case (ii) 
leads to case (iii), since although a theory can provide a condition on knowledge for an 
experimenter to use in determining whether two populations share a concept, the theory 
itself cannot be wholly independent of intuitions itself. Theories themselves are believed, 
in general, on the basis of experiments that confirm these experiments, as already shown 
in case (i), they require non-experimental intuitions. Thus, case (ii), indirectly via 
dependence on type (i) cases, leads to case (iii). Given the discussion of the knowledge 
example and cases (i) – (iii), one can argue as follows for (DT): 
 
1.) In a given experiment E in which one is attempting to test whether 
intuitions over C vary between two populations one must set a criterion 
that determines whether or not the two populations share C. 
 
2.) In order to set a criterion to determine whether the two populations 
share C one can either appeal to a distinct experiment E*, a theory T, or 
appeal to a non-experimental intuition about the boundary conditions of C. 
 




3.) If one appeals to a distinct E*, then ultimately one will end up 
appealing to a non-experimental intuition. 
 
4.) If one appeals to a theory T, then ultimately one will end up 
appealing to some non-experimental intuitions, since theories depend on 
experiments for confirming evidence.  
 
5.) So, in order to test for variation of intuitions under C, one must 
ultimately appeal to a non-experimental intuition. 
 
6.) Thus, non-experimental intuitions are essentially involved in the 
attempt to discover variation in intuitions between populations.  
 
(6) is a partial restatement of (DT). As a point of final clarification it should be noted that 
(DT) does not aim to establish either of the following two claims that participants in the 
debate over philosophical methodology have been interested in defending or attacking. 
 
(i) The non-experimental intuitions that experimental inquiry depends 
on are wholly a priori in character. 
 
(ii) The non-experimental intuitions that experimental inquiry depends 
on are reliable intuitions about a concept’s boundary conditions. 
  
It is possible that (DT) is true and (i) is false. For example, if Williamson (2007) is 
correct in questioning the distinction between the wholly a priori and wholly a posteriori 
components of concept possession, one could maintain that the non-experimental 
intuitions at play in (DT) are simply armchair intuitions.13 Where ‘armchair intuitions’ 
are simply non-experimental intuitions, which are neither wholly a priori nor wholly a 
posteriori.   
 
It is possible that (DT) is true and (ii) is false. For example, if there are no Platonic 
concepts, and instead there are only concepts generated by cultures from which we learn 
them, one could argue as follows. Our intuitions about the application of the concept of 
knowledge are not about any objective concept of knowledge. As a consequence, our 
intuitions are not reliable with respect to what the objective concept of knowledge really 
requires. Our intuitions might be reliable about what as individuals we believe falls under 
the concept of knowledge, but those intuitions are not tracking an objective mind 
independent fact about the concept of knowledge.   
 
The point of drawing out the dependency thesis is to reveal a metaphysical relationship 
that obtains between non-experimental intuitions and experimental inquiry into variation 
in intuitions. The thesis ultimately aims to make clear the idea that experimental inquiry 




into variation in intuitions between cultures is connected to a non-experimental activity 
that involves consulting intuitions. It is not brute luck that we would investigate whether 
knowledge entails belief cross culturally and at the same time ask whether knowledge 
entails truth as a way of determining whether both populations share the same concept. 
Our choice to ask whether knowledge entails truth, rather than whether knowledge 
entails, for example, that swans exist, reflects something about our understanding of, and 
intuitions about, what it is possible to discover about knowledge through experimental 
inquiry. If the (WNS) study is sound, it appears that it is possible to discover that two 
populations disagree over whether Gettier cases are cases of non-knowledge. However, if 
the dependency thesis is true, as I have argued, then there is some fact about knowledge 
for which the discovery of variation in intuitions would mean that the East Asians and 
Westerners did not share a common concept of knowledge. And more importantly, this 
fact about knowledge is likely something which we hold ultimately on the basis of a non-
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1 See Bealer (1996) & (2000), Sosa (2007a), Ludwig (2007), and Williamson (2007) for differing 
evidentialist accounts.  
2 See Alexander & Weinberg (2007) for a review of experimental critiques of the methods of traditional a 
priori analytic philosophy. 
3 See Cummins (1998) and Hintikka (1999) for examples of skepticism about the use of intuitions in 
philosophy that is not based on experimental research.    
4 See Weinberg (2007) for an excellent discussion of how to challenge the use of intuitions in philosophy. 
5 For recent discussion of the debate over experimental philosophy see Horvath & Grundmann (2010).  
6 Weinberg & Crowley (2009) explore a view called ‘loose constitutivity’ as a response to the experimental 
restrictionist’s challenge. Neither the articulation nor the defense of (DT) in this work is based on their 




                                                                                                                                        
work. While (DT) maybe loosely related to the loose constitutivity view of the relation between intuitions 
and concepts, (DT) is not to be associated with a defense of armchair methods in philosophy.  
7 There appears to be only two brief discussions of a point similar to that of (DT). One occurs in Weinberg 
(2007), and the other in Williamson (2004). 
8 As an actual example of the kind of case I am raising see Swain, Alexander, and Weinberg (2008). In that 
particular study, at footnote 7, they say the following, “228 students completed the survey; 8 were excluded 
due to responses to the screening question that suggested that they were working with a different 
conception of ‘knows’ than the one of interest to philosophers….” 
9 I would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for Essays in Philosophy for bringing this objection to my 
attention.  
10 See Sosa’s discussion of merely verbal disagreement in (2007b). The disagreement dilemma presented 
here is much stronger than the response that Sosa’ discusses in both (2007b) and (2010).  
11 In both (1) and (2) ‘concept’ and ‘concept possession’ are both being used in a way that is consistent with 
the idea that two subjects can possess the same concept at different levels of comprehension and grasp. I 
leave out the complication in order to simplify discussion of the main issue concerning disagreement.  
12 Weinberg and Crowley’s (2009) discussion of loose constitutivity vs. strict constitutivity comes closest 
to the discussion here concerning the disagreement dilemma, see pgs. 180-181. Strict constitutivity appears 
to be tied to the idea presented in (IMP) that disagreement in intuitions is sufficient for the possession of 
distinct concepts. Strict constitutivity holds that a subject’s intuitions strictly constitute the concept they 
possess. Loose constitutivity appears to be related the idea presented in (P) that subjects can possess the 
same concept, yet have different intuitions about the concepts application.    
13 See section 5 of Ch. 5 and Ch. 6. 
